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REcENT CASES
creditors of the deceased (including the Government). The court
first held that, under the rule of the Stern case, the limits of the
Government's right to recover in any action initiated against a trans-
feree under section 311 are established by state law. Since the Mich-
igan statute40 specifically provided that, in the absence of fraud,
proceeds from contracts of annuity are exempt from the claims of
creditors of the purchaser, where payable to someone other than the
debtor, the court concluded as a matter of law that the Government
was barred from any recovery of the proceeds of the annuity contracts.
(2) The Court could impose a uniform system of transferee lia-
bility based on the reasoning of the dissent in the Stern case. This
would insure that the result of the Ott case would not be reached in
other similar cases. Since all claims of the Federal Government have
long received preferred treatment over the claims of ordinary
creditors,41 and since enforcement and collection of the Federal in-
come tax is a matter of peculiarly national concern, the Court would
have both precedent and policy behind it should it adopt this solution.
John T. Bondurant
REAL PROPERTY-JOINT TENANCY-COMMENT-EFFECT ON
RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEE AND SURVIVING JOINT TENANT
OF MORTGAGE EXECUTED BY DECEASED JOINT TENANT
Appellant and her now deceased husband owned real property
in fee simple as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The deceased
husband, without the consent or knowledge of his wife, executed a
mortgage upon the property to the respondents. The state com-
menced an action to condemn the property, alleging that the appellant
owned the property and respondents were the mortgagees thereof.
Appellant answered that she was the sole owner of the property
and that respondents had no right, title, or interest therein. Respon-
40 Mich. Comp. Laws § 522.24 (1948).41 Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952), provides:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or
whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors
or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the de-
ceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied.,...
Unpaid taxes have been held to constitute "debts due to the United States" within
the meaning of this section and are entitled to be first satisfied in case of the
taxpayer's insolvency. Massachusetts v. United States, 833 U.S. 611 (1948).
However, under § 64 (a) (4) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (4) (1952), the United States has only a fourth
priority in bankruptcy for its unsecured tax claims, along with other unsecured
tax claimants; moreover, by virtue of § 64(a) (5) of the same Act, 30 Stat. 563
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (5) (1952), it has only a fifth priority
for unsecured non-tax claims.
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dents claimed that they were the owners and holders of the mort-
gage executed by the deceased husband and asked that the note
executed by the deceased husband, secured by the mortgage, be sat-
isfied from the proceeds of the condemnation award. The trial court
by memorandum ruling found that the value of the note was owing
to respondents and ordered this sum plus interest paid out of fifty
per cent of the fund remaining in the hands of a trustee after pay-
ment of certain liens concededly a charge upon the joint estate.
Held: Reversed. The wife was entitled to the entire condemnation
award, less the conceded liabilities. People v. Nogarr, 330 P. 2d 858
(Cal. 1958).
The effect of a mortgage executed by only one joint tenant upon
real property held in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship
depends on the legal theory of the mortgage in the particular juris-
diction. In jurisdictions where a mortgage effects a conveyance of
the property, it severs the joint tenancy.1 Severance converts the
joint tenancy 2 into a tenancy in common,3 and destroys the right of
survivorship.4 The severed interest of the then tenant in common
secures the mortgage after the death of the mortgagor.5 In juris-
dictions which consider a mortgage as nothing more than a mere lien
or charge upon the interest of the joint tenant, the apparent tech-
nical effect is that the unities of joint tenancy are unbroken by the
execution of the mortgage, and the interest of the mortgaging joint
tenant passes at his death to the survivor by virtue of the right of
survivorship, leaving nothing to secure the mortgage. Thus, in effect
the death of the mortgaging joint tenant terminates the mortgage
lien.6
1 York v. Stone, 1 Salk. 158, 91 Eng. Rep. 146 (Ch. 1709); In re Pollard's
Estate, 3 De. G.J. & S. 541, 46 Eng. Rep. 746 (Ch. 1863); Lawler v. Vyrne, 252
Ill. 194, 96 N.E. 892 (1911) (dictum); McPherson v. Snowden, 19 Md. 197
(1862); Eder v. Rothamel, 202 Md. 189, 95 A. 2d 860, 863 (1953) (dictum);
2 American Law of Property 9 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 Tiffany, Real Property 210
(3d ed. 1939); 2 Walsh, Commentaries on Real Property 12 (1947).
2 Obviously if there are more than two joint tenants only the interest severed
becomes a tenancy in common. The remaining joint tenants hold their respective
interests in joint tenancy with right of survivorship in relation to all the property
except the severed interest.
3 McDonald v. Morley, 15 Cal. 2d 409, 101 P. 2d 690, 129 A.L.R. 810 (1940);
Partridge v. Berliner, 325 III. 253, 156 N.E. 353 (1927); Morgan v. Catherwood,
95 Ind. App. 266, 167 N.E. 618 (1929); Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 287
N.W. 411, 124 A.L.R. 215 (1939); Grieger v. Pye, 210 Minn. 71, 297 N.W. 173
(1941); 2 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 1, at 12.
4 Morgan v. Catherwood, supra note 3; Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32
N.W. 2d 271 (1948); Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 130 N.J. Eq. 176, 21 A. 2d. 743
(1941); In re Cossitt's Estate, 204 App. Div. 545, 198 N.Y.S. 560 (1923);
Campbell v. Drozdowicz, 243 Wis. 354, 10 N.W. 2d 158 (1943).
5Z. V. Pate, Inc. v. Killock, 202 S.C. 522, 25 S.E. 2d 728 (1943). (by im-
plication).
6 2 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 1, at 210-211; 2 Walsh, op. cit. supra note
1, at 12.
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The principal case seems to be the only one squarely supporting
the rule that death of the joint tenant mortgagor destroys the mortgage
lien. Interestingly enough, in the principal case the case authority
relied upon involved judgment liens, 7 and an old age assistance
lien,s not a mortgage lien. The principle involved where a mortgage
is considered a lien is the same as in the case of judgment liens or
old age assistance liens. The judgment lien or old age assistance
lien attaches only to the joint tenant's interest.9 By virtue of the right
of survivorship a joint tenant's interest exists only during his life-
time. When he dies, his interest passes to the surviving joint tenant
at the instant of death in the sense that it ceases to exist. If the lien
attaches only to his interest, and that interest ceases to exist upon
his death, it necessarily follows that when the interest to which the
lien attached is terminated, and there is nothing remaining for the
lien to attach to, the lien in effect is terminated also and consequently
unenforceable. 10 It is conceded that the theory of the lien underlying
the result in the principal case is consistent with accepted legal
principles concerning joint ownership with right of survivorship.
However, as discussed more fully later, one may question the prac-
tical effect of this result and contend that the theory of the lien should
be rationalized differently in relation to the legal doctrine controlling
the right of survivorship.
At least two "lien theory" states, in order to avoid the loss of old
age assistance liens upon interests of joint tenants, have enacted
statutes on the matter. These statutes specifically provide that the
application for and acceptance of old age assistance payments under
the law providing for a lien results in a severance of the joint ten-
ancy," or that the lien does not sever the joint tenancy but the lien
is enforceable after the death of the recipient.'2
7 Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P. 2d 118 (1942); Power v.
Grace, (1932) 1 D.L.R. 801 (1931).
8 Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235, 41 N.W. 2d 444 (1950).
9Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P. 2d 118 (1942); Gau v.
Hyland, supra note 8.
10 Zeigler v. Bonnell, supra note 9; Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449,
61 N.E. 2d 358, 161 A.L.R. 1133 (1945); Peoples Trust & Savings Bank v.
Haas, 828 IMI. 468, 160 N.E. 85 (1928); Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 486, 149
N.W. 613, 1917 B. Ann. Gas. 116 (1914); Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235, 41 N.W.
2d 444 (1950); Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657,
111 A.L.R. 168 (1937).
11 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 68-215.09 (1958) provides in part:
[T]he application for and acceptance of such old age assistance, when
the lien is properly recorded, shall result in the severance of the joint
tenancy and the creation of a tenancy in common giving the county and
the State of Nebraska an enforceable old age assistance lien....
12 Wis. Stat. § 49.26(5) (a) (1957) provides in part:
Such lien shall not sever a joint tenancy nor affect the right of sur-
vivorship except that the lien shall be enforceable to the extent that
the beneficiary had an interest prior to his decease.
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A different result from that of the principal case has been reached
in a case involving a mortgage executed by a joint tenant in a lien
theory state. In the case of Wilken v. Young,13 the Supreme Court
of Indiana held that a mortgage lien after the death of the joint
tenant mortgagor was valid to the extent necessary for security and
that the right of survivorship had effectively passed the equity of
redemption to the surviving joint tenant.
There is respectable authority supporting the proposition that
the joint tenancy may be suspended during the temporary alien-
ation of -a part of one of the joint tenant's interest and revived when
the alienation is terminated.14 The Supreme Court of California has
recognized the temporary suspension of a joint tenancy effected by the
conveyance of an interest for life, the joint tenancy reviving upon
the termination of the life interest. 15 This approach, so far as can be
determined, has never been used in relation to the mortgaging of a
joint tenant's interest in real property.
Conceding that the result of the principal case is sound in prin-
ciple, it is felt that the practicality of such a rule is questionable.
The necessary implication of this result is that a joint tenant is in-
directly deprived of the right to mortgage his interest because
lenders will not accept security that can be defeated upon the death
of the mortgagor by the right of survivorship.
The Indiana Supreme Court in the Wilken case reached what is
believed to be a desirable result, although it must be agreed that
the court's theory was incorrect. 16 One authority, however, has sug-
gested that the result is "impossible and unthinkable,"I T the author
expresses his belief in terms of the choice that must be made: "[E]ither
that a mortgage is a mere lien, like a judgment lien, in which case
it is subject to be defeated by survivorship in case the mortgagor
die before his cotenants, or else the technical legal title passes
under a mortgage, the unities are broken, and the joint tenancy is
at an end in so far as the interest mortgaged is concerned."' 8 It is
felt that such strict adherence to either of these two diverse prin-
ciples is not altogether necessary. In the first place, as suggested
previously, if a mortgage is merely a lien the joint tenants are in-
1$ 144 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68 (1895).
14 Napier v. Williams [1911] 1 Ch. 361; Roe v. Lonsdale, 12 East 39, 104
Eng. Rep. 16 (K.B. 1810); Challis, Real Property § 367 (3rd ed. Sweet 1911);
2 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 1, at 14; 2 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 1, at 209.
15 Hammond v. McArthur, 30 Cal. 2d 512, 183 P. 2d 1 (1947).
16 For a joint tenancy to exist there must be unity of time, title, interest
and possession. If at the time of death the deceased's interest consisted only of
an equity of redemption, while his co-tenant's interest was in fee, there could
be no unity of interest.
17 2 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 1, at 12.
18 Ibid.
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directly deprived of their right to mortgage their respective inter-
ests. Certainly if a person owns an interest in property which he
has a right to convey, he should also be able to mortgage it in order
to secure his debts without the indirect interference of the law. If
the mortgage is treated as a conveyance, on the ,other hand, and the
mortgage is executed with no desire to sever the joint tenancy and
the mortgaging tenant survives, he will lose the benefit of survivorship
since the interest of the other tenant will descend to that tenant's
heirs by virtue of the severance. Moreover, the non-mortgaging joint
tenant is deprived of his right of survivorship even if the mortgage
is satisfied during the lifetime of both of the joint tenants. It would
be better not to penalize both of the joint tenants to this extent
merely because one of them desires to exercise one of his most
valuable property rights. This undesirable penalty results from too
strict adherence to aged principles.
Both the California Court in the principal case and Walsh, in
his commentaries on real property, assail the result of the Wilken
case on the ground that the mortgaging joint tenant gains an unfair
advantage regardless of which one survives. The basis of their argu-
ment is that if the non-mortgaging joint tenant is the survivor he re-
ceives an encumbered one-half while if he predeceases the mort-
gaging joint tenant, the latter receives an unencumbered one-half.19
This consequence, however, is entirely within the control of the non-
mortgaging joint tenant. If he desires to avoid the possibility of his
co-tenant receiving his unencumbered one-half, he has every right
to sever the joint tenancy and destroy the right of survivorship by
the execution of a trust deed,20 or by outright conveyance, 21 which
will prevent the cotenant from obtaining his interest. Such an action
on his part will also destroy his right of survivorship. If he chooses
to preserve his right of survivorship, there is no valid reason why he
should receive his cotenant's interest unencumbered in the event
the mortgagor dies first without having satisfied the mortgage. The
choice is his, and the law should not repudiate his choice thereby
forcing the loss upon the mortgagee. This can hardly be called an
unfair advantage. At most it is only a possibility, and the non-mort-
gaging joint tenant has the exclusive control of the possibility.
19 People v. Nogarr, 330 P. 2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1958); 2 Walsh, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 13.2o Partridge v. Berliner, 325 IMI. 253, 156 N.E. 353 (1927); Hardin v. Wolf,
318 Ill. 48, 148 N.E. 868 (1925) (dictum); Wolf v. Johnson, 157 Md. 112, 145
AUt. 363 (1929).21Szymcack v. Szymcack, 306 I]]. 541, 138 N.E. 218 (1923); Morgan v.
Catherwood, 95 Ind. App. 266, 167 N.E. 618 (1929); Campbell v. Drozdowicz,
243 Wis. 354, 10 N.W. 2d 158 (1943).
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Conclusion
There is a very practical solution to this problem, which does not
offend the principles of joint tenancy, permits joint tenants to mort-
gage their interests with assurance to their creditors that the lien will
not be defeated by.the right of survivorship, and does not destroy
the right of survivorship through severance. This solution is based
on the temporary suspension of the joint tenancy which has been
recognized by the courts.
If the mortgage were conceived to merely suspend the joint
tenancy at the time of the execution of the mortgage, it would be
revived by the redemption of the mortgage and there would be no
destruction of the unities of joint tenancy. The right of survivorship
could not defeat the mortgage lien because it would be inoperative
to pass the interest of the deceased to the survivor until the mortgage
had been redeemed, to the extent of the interest of the joint tenant
mortgagor. This solution permits the non-mortgaging joint tenant, if
he is the survivor, to obtain the complete interest, if he so desires,
by satisfying the mortgage to the extent of the deceased's interest,
but does not deprive him completely of his right of survivorship as
would a complete severance. The mortgaging joint tenant would not
be deprived of his right of survivorship, if he is the survivor, and the
deceased cotenant has chosen not to defeat that right by severance
of the joint tenancy. Neither of the joint tenants are deprived of the
right of survivorship as they would be by complete severance, in the
event the mortgage is satisfied during both of their lifetimes, since
upon redemption of the mortgage the joint tenancy is revived ex-
actly as it was prior to the execution of the mortgage. The greatest
advantage of such a solution would be that joint tenants would be
able to freely exercise a valuable property right, that of mortgaging
their respective interests to secure their debts.
William A. Logan
CGnvnNAL LAw-HABrrUAL CUnvMAL STATUTE-INSTUCTIONS TO JURIES.
Defendant was convicted of storehouse breaking and his punishment
fixed at imprisonment for life under the Habitual Criminal Statute.1
IKy. Rev. Stat. § 431.190 (1959).
Conviction of felony; punishment on second and third offenses ...
if convicted a third time of felony, he shall be confined in the pen-
itentiary during his life. Judgment in such cases shall not be given
for the increased penalty unless the jury finds, from the record and
other competent evidence, the fact of former convictions for felony
committed by the prisoner, in or out of this state. (Emphasis added.)
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